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DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX AND
ILLEGITIMACY IS PERMISSIBLE IN THE
IMMIGRATION AREA-FIALLO V. BELL
In a recent decision, Fiallo v. Bell,' the Supreme Court has
implied that equal protection, guaranteed to every citizen by the
Constitution, 2 may be denied to fathers and illegitimate children
who are citizens if the discriminatory classification is made in the con-
text of the immigration laws. 3 Noting the broad power Congress has
over aliens 4 and the political nature of this area, 5 the Court declined
the opportunity to distinguish this case from prior immigration cases
even though this was not the ordinary instance of preferring one type
of alien over another. In Fiallo a relationship with particular citizens
determined the class, 6 and the discrimination that occurred was not
between aliens, but between citizens.
Plaintiffs were three sets of unwed biological fathers and their il-
legitimate children7 who challenged the constitutionality of sections
1. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
2. "No State shall ... .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This same protection is also imposed on the federal
government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
3. 430 U.S. at 800.
4. "'[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over the admission of aliens."' Id. at 792, quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strananhan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
5. "'ITIhe power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow
judicial review.'" Id., quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976). The
political aspect of the immigration area is derived from the concept of sovereign power of the
federal government. Because of its sovereign power, the federal government has an enormous
amount of control in the area of immigration law. However, the courts have found immigration
issues to be justiciable and thus not precluded from judicial review. Immigration disputes are
not primarily a function of the legislature and therefore are not immune from judicial review
under the separation of powers principle. Likewise, such disputes are not immune from review
under the political question doctrine. See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
6. 430 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 170
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
7. The hopelessness of the plaintiffs' situation is exemplified by the Wilson family. Arthur
Wilson acknowledged Trevor and Earl as his illegitimate sons. He lived with them and sup-
ported them until 1968, at which time they moved to New York City with their mother. From
1968 until 1974, Mr. Wilson maintained his relationship with his sons by visits and correspon-
dence. He also continued to support them financially. After their mother died in 1974, the two
boys asked their father to come to live with them in the United States, but Mr. Wilson was
only able to stay for as long as an emergency visa allowed. Since his children were illegitimate,
Mr. Wilson was unable to settle in this country without a labor certificate. However, if a
mother were in Mr. Wilson's position or if the children were legitimate, the parent would have
been able to enter the country without a labor certificate. 406 F. Supp. at 169-70. Substantial
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101(b)(1)(D)8 and (b)(2) 9 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 10
These sections define "child" and "parent" for the purpose of deter-
mining immediate relative status. The importance of this status is that
it allows an alien to circumvent the quota on admissions"X and the
labor certification.' 2  Aliens seeking entry are subject to annual nu-
evidence exists to prove that Arthur Wilson is the natural father of the children. Since the
mother died, the children can never be legitimized. Therefore, either the children will become
wards of the state or they will be forced to give up their citizenship. Congress never intended
such a harsh result, especially in light of the purpose in enacting the amendment: to reunite the
family and alleviate hardships imposed upon the American citizen. 103 CONC. REc. 14659
(1957). For information on the other plaintiffs, see 406 F. Supp. at 169-70.
8. Section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states:
(1) The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age
who is-
(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status,
privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural
mother;
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1970).
9. Section 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states:
The terms "parent," "father," or "mother" mean a parent, father, or mother only
where the relationship exists by reason of any of the circumstances set forth in
subdivision (1) of this subsection.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1970).
10. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
11. Aside from exceptions for "special immigrants," § 1101(a)(27), and "immediate relatives,"
§ 1151(b), the quota on admissions is set at not more than 45,000 persons for each of the first
three quarters of any fiscal year and not more than 170,000 persons for the full fiscal year. 8
U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970).
1921 marked the origin of quota laws in the United States. After World War I, poverty,
distress, hunger, and disease was widespread in Europe. It was estimated that between two
million and eight million persons in Germany alone wanted to come to the United States. The
Congress at the time was concerned with housing, disease, unemployment, and the adverse
effect on business conditions that would result if they did not restrict the influx of immigrants
into the United States. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1666-67. See Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1075, 1076-78 (1974). See also Symposium, The Immigration System: Need to Elimi-
nate Discrimination and Delay, 8 U. CALIF. D. L. REv. 191, 195-210 (1970).
12. Section 212(a)(14) of the Act states the following requirement for labor certification:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the
Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient
workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the
time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place to
which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the
employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working condi-
tions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970). Effective January 1, 1977, the immediate relative status will no
longer exempt an alien from the requirement of obtaining a labor certificate. Pub. L. No.
94-571 (1976). This amendment, however, has a savings clause which says that it will not oper-
ate to affect the entitlement of an alien who has applied for the preference prior to the effective
date. Therefore, this law would not affect the plaintiffs if the Court had ruled in their favor.
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merical limitations and, if their objective is to perform skilled or un-
skilled labor, must be certified by the Secretary of Labor. An im-
mediate relative 13 is exempt from both requirements. Under the
challenged sections, 14 special preference is granted to an illegitimate
child by virtue of its relationship with its natural mother but is de-
nied if the relationship is with its natural father.
The statutory provisions were attacked on the grounds that they
violated equal protection by discrimination against the plaintiffs as
natural fathers 15 and illegitimate children. The plaintiffs also alleged
that the statute denied them due process of law 16 and infringed upon
their fundamental right to privacy and mutual association. The
three-judge district court, 17 with one judge dissenting,' 8 rejected the
plaintiffs' contentions. Emphasizing the exclusive power of Congress
in the immigration area, the lower court held that the provisions
were neither "wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose" 19
nor "fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regula-
tion of immigration." 20
See Rodino, The Impact of Immigrants on the American Labor Market, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
245 (1974). The purpose of requiring a labor certificate was to protect the United States laborers
from competition with alien workers.
13. "Immediate relatives" mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United
States. They are admitted without regard to the numerical limitations imposed on all other
aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
14. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1970).
15. The fathers claimed discrimination on the grounds of gender and marital status. 430
U.S. at 791.
16. The plaintiffs claimed that there was established "an unwarranted conclusive presump-
tion of the absence of strong psychological and economic ties between natural fathers and their
children born out of wedlock and not legitimated." id. However, the Court did not direct itself
to this issue. If it had, the Court would have had to have dealt with the decisions that have held
irrebuttable presumptions to be unconstitutional. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446-54
(1973), the Court found that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
permit a state to deny an individual the opportunity to present evidence that he is a bona fide
resident entitled to in-state tuition rates, on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presump-
tion of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and
when the state has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Similarly,
the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 657-58 (1972) found that the presumption
under Illinois law that unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents is violative of due
process, and that an unwed father must be granted a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
his children could be taken from him in a dependency proceeding after death of the children's
natural mother.
17. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
18. Id. at 168 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein argued that the classification
created by Congress pertained to citizens and permanent residents and, therefore, should be
subjected to more meaningful scrutiny. Id. at 170.
19. Id. at 166.
20. Id.
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The Supreme Court refused to accept the Government's position
that a "substantive policy regulating the admission of aliens in the
United States [is] not an appropriate subject for judicial review," 21
but nevertheless upheld the validity of the statute. The decision to
exclude aliens, the Court stated, involved fundamental principles of
sovereignty, 22 was subject to limited judicial scrutiny, and did not
violate the equal protection rights of plaintiffs. The majority would
not acknowledge that the rights of citizens were involved. 23 Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, strongly dissented, 24 charac-
terizing the scrutiny employed by the majority as "abdication."25
This Note will examine the constitutional basis of congressional au-
thority to regulate immigration and the judicial authority to review
legislation in this area. After demonstrating that the fact of citizenship
of the plaintiffs distinguishes this case from the precedent relied upon
by the majority, it will argue that the Court should have employed
traditional equal protection analysis. Finally, the impact of this deci-
sion will be considered.
EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW
Congress received its authority to control immigration from the
Constitution .under the delegated power of Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. 26  For the first one hundred years of
21. 430 U.S. at 793 n.5, quoting Brief for Appellee at 19-24. The Appellee relied upon a
number of cases including: Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953); and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. 430 U.S. at 792. Justice Field writing for the majority in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 (1889), stated that the power to exclude was one of "those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution." Id. at 609. His juxtaposition of these two words, "sovereign"
and "delegated," has led to the development of the "plenary power" doctrine in the area of
immigration and has also caused much confusion. Plenary power refers to the expansiveness of
Congress' power to legislate in the immigration area. Yet, the use of sovereignty and delegation
to describe this power is contradictory. A sovereign power is one inherent in an independent
nation. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). On the other hand, if
the source of a delegated power is the Constitution, then the power must be exercised within
constitutional limits. See generally Helbush, Aliens, Deportation and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Critical Reappraisal, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 23 (1975); Quarles, The iFederal Gov-
ernment: As To Foreign Affairs, Are Its Powers Inherent As Distinguished From Delegated?, 32
GEO. L.J. 375 (1944).
23. 430 U.S. at 795-96 n.6.
24. 430 U.S. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress receives its power over naturalization under
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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this nation's existence, immigration was essentially unrestricted.
Thereafter, the legislation that evolved either prohibited the entry of
certain types of aliens 27 or limited the number of any nationality en-
tering the United States. 28
In 1952 Congress made substantial changes in the existing immigra-
tion and naturalization laws by introducing a system of selective im-
migration by giving special preferences to relatives of United States
citizens. 29  The sections challenged in Fiallo were part of certain
1957 amendments to this 1952 Act. 30 These sections granting prefer-
ences were substantially different from the rest of the immigration
legislation that was passed, because only these sections were directed
to citizens.
3 1
The Fiallo Court assumed that the citizen had no right in the ad-
mission of the alien, only an interest in that admission. 32  However,
the statutory language and articulated purpose of the challenged sec-
tions of the Act clearly demonstrate that preferences were established
for the benefit of the citizen. According to the legislative history, the
purpose of the preferential status was to alleviate the hardships of
American citizens caused by separation of families. 33 The history
mentioned several times that "Congress intended to provide for a lib-
eral treatment of children and was concerned with the problems of
keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united." 34
With this objective, section 1154(a) 35 sets forth a procedure by which
an alien may receive a preference. The section begins by stating that
"any citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled to a
preference status by reason of the relationship . . . may file a petition
with the Attorney General." 36 It appears clear from the language that
27. Early legislation prohibited the entry of convicts and prostitutes, Act of March 3, 1875,
18 Stat. 477, Chinese laborers, Act of May 6, 1882 ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, those advocating the
overthrow of the government, Act of March 3, 1903 ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, and beggars, id.
28. In 1921, Congress passed the first quota law limiting the number of any nationality
entering the United States to 3% of foreign-born persons of that nationality who lived in the
United States in 1910. Act of May 19, 1921 ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5. See note 11 supra.
29. A child born to an American outside the United States may come into the country under
the preferential status of an immediate relative. However, he is not automatically a citizen.
Rather, he is a "derivative citizen," who must satisfy certain statutory conditions in order to
become an American citizen. See Symposium, The Conditional Nature of Derivative Citizen-
ship, 8 U. CALIF. D. L. REv. 345 (1975).
30. Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639.
31. See note 38 infra.
32. 430 U.S. at 795-76 n.6.
33. 103 CONG. REC. 14659 (1957).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2020 (emphasis added).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1970).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress specifically granted the privilege of petitioning for a pref-
erential status to the citizen. Aliens cannot petition directly. 37  The
citizen is the person who has the right to request the preference, and
it is this statutory right that is affected. 38 Therefore, when a right is
given to everyone except a small designated group of citizens, the
Court should review the classification as it would any other discrimi-
nation since it is citizens', not aliens' rights that are affected.
PRIOR CASE LAW
In reaching its decision in Fiallo the Supreme Court relied upon
prior immigration cases which involved disputes between aliens and
the government. 39 That situation presented little conflict and re-
quired minimal analysis because the alien had no constitutional right
to enter this country.40 However, Fiallo involved citizens, aliens and
the government, and therefore presented a more complex problem:
an apparent conflict between Congress' exclusive right to regulate
immigration and citizens' constitutionally protected rights to equal
protection and due process.
37. If a citizen does not file, an alien will not qualify as an "immediate relative" no matter
how he might otherwise fit the statutory definition.
38. It is significant to note that § 1154(a) is the only section in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act directly affecting the admission or entry (or reentry) of aliens in which application is to
be filed by the citizen. In all other sections, application is to be filed by the alien. See § 1202(a)
(application for visa); § 1203(a) (reentry permit); § 1254 (suspension of deportation); § 1302
(registration of aliens); § 1326(2) (reentry of deported aliens); § 1445(a) (requirements of naturali-
zation).
39. See Calvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (alien challenged sufficiency of evidence to
sustain his deportation and attacked the constitutionality of the Internal Security Act);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (Greek national challenged the validity of his
deportation proceeding and attacked the constitutionality of the Alien Registration Act); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (Chinese laborer filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus challenging his deportation proceeding).
40. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530-32 (1954); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). However, alieiis are enti-
tled to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). An alien is a person for purposes of procedural due process requirement
of the Fifth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Aliens are also persons
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, See Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (Court found provision excluding aliens from the New York state
civil service employment unconstitutional); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Connecticut
blanket exclusion of aliens from the practice of law held unconstitutional). See also Helbush,
Aliens, Deportation and the Equal Protection Clause: A Critical Reappraisal, 6 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 23, 38-45 (1975);. Synopsis, Recent Developments in Immigration Law 1976, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 301, 317-19 (1976).
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Although Congress has the exclusive power to make policy con-
cerning the entry of aliens, 41 neither early precedent 42 nor constitu-
tional authority 43 vested in Congress an unfettered discretion. The
Constitution is an instrument of checks and balances, and the concept
of unrestrained power is "manifestly contrary to the objectives of
those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were re-
sponsible for the Bill of Rights .... '"44 The powers enumerated in
the Constitution are limited by the restraints incorporated in that in-
strument, and the Court cannot interpret a constitutional power
granted to Congress in a way that would conflict with or violate
another section of the Constitution, namely the Bill of Rights. 45
The Court itself recognized a restraint on congressional power in a
recent immigration case, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.4 6  In
41. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), a Mexican-alien alleged that he had joined the
Communist party without knowledge of its advocacy of violence and challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Internal Security Act. The Court held that "[t]he power of Congress over the
admission of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching as it does basic
aspects of national sovereignty." Id. at 530. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953), an alien was excluded from the United States for security reasons. He was
stranded on Ellis Island because other countries would not take him back. The Court held that
continued exclusion, without a hearing, did not deprive the plaintiff of any constitutional right
because the "[c]ourts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamen-
tal sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control." Id. at 210. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), a Greek
national filed a petition for habeas corpus because he was challenging the validity of his deporta-
tion. Iqe claimed that although he was a member of the Communist party, his membership
terminated before the enactment of the Alien Registration Act of 1940. The Court sustained the
constitutionality of the Act which made membership in the Communist party grounds for depor-
tation because the authority to restrict aliens arises under international law as a power inherent
in every sovereign state. Id. at 587-89. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
42. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). There is some evidence
that the early cases are not the strongest precedent. Helbush, Aliens, Deportation and the
Equal Protection Clause:A Critical Reappraisal, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 23, 27 (1975); Recent
Decisions: Constitutional Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 177, 182-83 (1975); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 782-85 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4, 11. Congressional power over aliens is found in the
delegated powers of foreign commerce, naturalization, and war.
44. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957). At issue in this case was the supremacy of the
Constitution over Congress' treaty power. Justice Black argues that the Constitution is a model
of power and restraint. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
45. In Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890), the Court stated that "[t]he treaty power, as
expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found
in that instrument against the action of the government. . . . It would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids .. ." Id. at 267. See Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 264 (1967); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
46. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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Brignoni-Ponce, the government had infringed upon the Fourth
Amendment rights47 of citizens while acting pursuant to a provision
of the Act which was directed to aliens. Responding to this violation,
the Court stated:
Although we may assume for purposes of this case that the broad
congressional power over immigration . . . authorizes Congress to
admit aliens on condition that they will submit to reasonable ques-
tioning about their right to be and remain in this country, this
power cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens
who may be mistaken for aliens. 48
The majority in Fiallo rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Congress'
power could not diminish Fifth Amendment rights of citizens and dis-
tinguished the Brignoni-Ponce decision by saying that "at issue [in
Brignoni-Ponce] . . . was the nature of the protections mandated by
the Fourth Amendment with respect to government procedures de-
signed to stem the illegal entry of aliens." 9 The Court further
reasoned that since an "exercise of the Nation's sovereign power to
admit or exclude foreigners"50 was involved, the statutory discrimina-
tion would be subject only to limited judicial review. However, the
Court failed to notice that the same "sovereign power" was involved
in Brignoni-Ponce and that they neither limited their review nor hesi-
tated in restricting Congress' power in that decision.
The Fiallo Court also placed great reliance upon a 1973 immigra-
tion decision, Kleindienst v. Mandel,51 for its position that an alleged
infringement of a citizen's fundamental right does not require a stric-
ter standard of review. In Kleindienst, a Belgian alien and American
citizens brought an action to compel the Attorney General to issue a
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizures ... "
48. 422 U.S. at 883-84. In an earlier case, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), a Mexican citizen was arrested for illegally importing marijuana when a warrantless
search of his automobile was made without probable cause by a roving patrol of the United
States Border Patrol. The Court held that the search was not a border search, was not justified
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and violated the alien's rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion stressed that the government's need to
enforce immigration laws must be consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 284 (Powell, J., concurring). In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976),
the Court made its most recent statement on the issue of Fourth Amendment rights and the
government's interest in stopping the illegal entry of aliens. The Court held that the stopping
and questioning of occupants of automobiles may be "made in the absence of any individualized
suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints." Id. at 562. See generally Symposium, Border
Searches: Beyond Ahneida-Sanchez, 8 U. CALIF. D. L. REV. 163 (1975).
49. 430 U.S. at 794.
50. Id. at 795-96 n.6.
51. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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waiver 52 to the alien-journalist so that he might enter the country on
a temporary basis to participate in academic conferences and discus-
sions. The citizens claimed that failure to allow his entry would be a
violation of their First Amendment 'right of freedom of speech and
the right to receive information. 53 The Kleindienst Court rejected
this argument and applied only a limited review.5 4
Kleindienst, however, is distinguishable from Fiallo in several im-
portant respects. First, the stated purpose of section 212(a)(28)(D),
which was used to exclude the alien-journalist in Kleindienst, was to
assure "that undesirable aliens will not gain admission to the United
States." 55 The section excluded aliens "who advocate the economic,
international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the
establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship.
...-56 Throughout the section the emphasis is directed towards
aliens. 57  Any effect which this provision might have upon the rights
of citizens is "merely an incidental and unavoidable consequence of
that political judgment." 5 8 On the other hand, the stated purpose in
Fiallo was to alleviate hardships of the American citizens by reuniting
their families.59 For this reason, only citizens are allowed to peti-
tion. 60
Another point of distinction between Kleindienst and Fiallo in-
volves the nature of the complaint in the cases. In Kleindienst the
plaintiffs conceded that Congress had the authority to exclude the
52. Id. at 756. The procedure for obtaining a waiver is set out at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)
(1970). The Attorney General has the power to waive exclusion for any or no reason. Sym-
posium, Idealogical Restrictions on Immigration, 8 U. CALIF. D. L. REV. 217, 234-37 (1975).
53. 408 U.S. at 760. The citizens also contended that § 212(a)(28) denied them equal protec-
tion by permitting entry of "rightists" but not "leftists" and that same section deprived them of
procedural due process. Id.
54. Id. at 770. The Court accepted the Attorney General's facially legitimate reason for
denying the waiver and refused to look behind the exercise of the discretion. Id. at 769-70.
55. H.R. REP. No. 2379, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1698.
56. 8 U.S.C. 1 l182(a)(28)(D)(1970).
57. 8 U.S.C. 1 l182(a)(28)(D) (1970). The statutory provision involved in Kleindeinst is part
of the Immigration and Nationality Act's section entitled "Excludable aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1970). Subsection 28, the subsection involved in Kleindienst contains nine provisions (A
through I), all of which refer specifically to aliens. Citizens are not mentioned. Furthermore, §
1182(d)(3), the provision which permits waiver of ineligibility, makes it clear that it is the alien
who is filing the application when it states "'[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, an alien (A)
who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa [may be granted a waiver]." Id.
58. 430 U.S. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
60. See note 37 supra. Section 1154(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that
"any citizen ...may file a petition... '" 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1970). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d)
(1970).
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aliens who held beliefs similar to the alien-journalist Mandel 61 and
challenged only the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in
denying a waiver. The plaintiffs asked the Court to weigh the Attor-
ney General's discretion against their First Amendment right to be
informed. 62 The Court reviewed the facts and found no abuse of the
discretion because the denial was based on a "legitimate and bona
fide reason." 63 The Court hesitated in finding an abuse, because it
feared the possibility of reviewing every instance where the Attorney
General denies an ineligible alien's entry into the country. 64 In
Fiallo, however, the plaintiffs were challenging a statutory provision
which they considered to be unconstitutional on its face, and the
threat of a case-by-case review was not present. 65  Consequently, the
Fiallo Court's reliance upon the Kleindienst decision seems inappro-
priate.
APPROPRIATE METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Since citizens' rights were affected and since the Court was asked
to determine the constitutionality of an act of Congress, the Fiallo
Court should have employed the same judicial review that any other
equal protection case would have required. The standard of review
previously employed in equal protection analysis has been articulated
as a two-tier model. If the government discriminates against a "sus-
pect" class 66 or if a fundamental right 67 is involved the Court will
apply rigid scrutiny. This level of review requires the government to
carry the burden of proof by showing that their action furthers a
compelling state interest and is the least restrictive alternative capa-
ble of accomplishing the state interest in order to justify the discrimi-
61. 408 U.S. at 767.
62. Id. at 754.
63. Id. at 770. The Court found that past abuses of the privilege by Mandel was a legitimate
and bona fide reason for denying the waiver. Id. at 769.
64. Id. at 768-69.
65. 430 U.S. at 791.
66. Suspect classes are usually described as "discrete and insular minorities" because they
are powerless to protect their interests in the political system. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Examples of a suspect class are alienage, race, and nationality. See Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); and Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (nationality).
67. A fundamental right is a right "explicitly or implicity guaranteed by the Constitution."
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). See, e.g., Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (freedom of speech); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
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nation. 68 If, on the other hand, no suspect class or fundamental right
is involved, the rational basis test is applied. The legislation is pre-
sumed to be reasonable, and all that the government must show is a
rational relationship between the purpose of the law and the classifi-
cation. 69
This two-tier theory, however, does not adequately explain the
level of scrutiny the Court has applied in all areas of equal protec-
tion. 70 In Fiallo the classes discriminated against were natural
68. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court found a one year residency
requirement for receiving welfare assistance to be unconstitutional because the effect of the
requirement was to inhibit the exercise of the fundamental right to interstate travel. The Court
held that the government failed to justify the one year requirement with assertions that it
facilitates planning of the welfare budget, minimizes fraudulent claims, provides an objective
test for residency and encourages new residents to work. Some examples of cases where the
Court has found a legitimate compelling state interest are Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(protecting potential life in the last trimester of pregnancy) and Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (national security in time of war). See generally Bice, Standards of Judicial
Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause, 50 S. CALIF. L. REV. 689, 689-718
(1977).
69. The rational basis test would be applied, for example, in the areas of socio-economics
where the Court traditionally has deferred to legislative wisdom. See Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); Lindsey v. N')rmet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
(housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (welfare benefits); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state economic legislation).
70. Members of the Court have acknowledged that the Court uses other levels of scrutiny
besides the traditional two levels. Justice Powell, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), rec-
ognized a middle-tier that is used in scrutinizing gender-based classifications. Id. at 464 n.*
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), found that the Court took a "reasoned approach" which he described as a func-
tion of three variables: characterization of the classification, the importance of the right being
infringed upon, and the asserted state interest. Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Legal commentators have also noted the inherent weakness of the present two tier system.
One authority proposed a three tier approach to equal protection in which the alleged discrimi-
nation is classified into one of three groups:
(1) prohibited, which is similar to the present suspect classification,
(2) permissive, which is similar to the present rational basis classification, or
(3) neutral, in which the state must show the means used bears a factually demon-
strable relationship to the stated objective.
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee -Prohi-
bited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1092-93 (1974). See also
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Professor
Gunther proposed a two tier approach of equal protection with the standard of strict scrutiny
retained for those classifications which are suspect or where a fundamental right has been in-
fringed upon. The second tier is a flexible revitalized standard of rational basis for all other
classes. The primary focus of the flexible standard is on the means utilized by the government
rather than on the ends sought. See generally Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clause, 50 S. CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1977); Turkington, Equal
Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 387-90 (1976); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
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fathers and illegitimate children. Classifications based on gender or
legitimacy have received more than mininal review. The Court re-
quires that the government show that the method employed hears a
"fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 71 When
the Court reviews sex or illegitimacy cases it looks at the stated pur-
pose of the statute and will not substitute another purpose. In neither
situation is administrative or economic efficiency a sufficient justifica-
tion. 72
The courts which have dealt with the classification in Fiadlo, there-
fore, should have asked whether it bore a "fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation." However, the lower court re-
jected the purpose found in the legislative history 73 of reuniting
families and substituted instead the objective of minimizing the po-
tential for spurious claims and facilitating administrative conveni-
ence. 74  A majority of the Supreme Court accepted this theory. 75
Administrative efficiency has not been accepted as a sufficient
justification under prior holdings, and does not bear a "fair and sub-
stantial" relation to the section excluding natural fathers and illegiti-
mates. 76  As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, 7 7 a step-
mother who petitions for her husband's illegitimate child must prove
71. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (Court found mandatory provision of the Idaho
probate law giving preference to men over women in appointing administrators violative of the
equal protection clause). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger. v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court was dealing with a
discrimination against illegitimate children. In that decision, the Court stated that equal protec-
tion "requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose." Id. at 172.
72. The Court refused to uphold the constitutionality of gender-based classifications when
the asserted purpose was administrative efficiency. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Neither would it uphold the constitutionality of
legislation that discriminated against illegitimates for that reason. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). However, in Mathews
v. Lucus, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), a provision of the Social Security Act conditioned the eligibility
of illegitimate children for surviving child's insurance benefits upon a showing that the deceased
wage earner was the claimant's parent. The Court acknowledged that the purpose of the provi-
sion was "obviously to serve administrative convenience," and it held that such a purpose was
permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as it did not "exceed the bounds of substan-
tiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny." Id. at 509.
73. "In a number of other instances, the statutory language makes it clear that the underly-
ing intent of the legislation was to preserve the family unit upon immigration to the United
States." H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2021.
74. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 167 (1975).
75. 430 U.S. at 795-96.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. 430 U.S. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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not only his paternity but also their marriage. More is required of the
stepmother and, consequently, the justification of undue costs in-
volving proof of paternity is invalid.
Another possibility is that the actual purpose of the statute was to
reunite families. However, such an argument could not even pass a
minimal scrutiny analysis, let alone a stricter one. In Trimble v. Gor-
don, 78 which was decided the same day as Fiallo, the issue was the
constitutionality of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act which al-
lowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from
their natural mothers, but not from their natural fathers. The Court
stated that "when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and
fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises stricter scrutiny""
and held that the discriminatory classification was unconstitutional.
Given the similarity of the classification in Trimble and Fiallo, the
Court in Fiallo clearly would have found the challenged classification
to be unconstitutional if it had been outside the area of immigration.
Another aspect of the equal protection issue in Fiallo involved the
fundamental right of privacy and mutual association. Statutes which
directly intrude upon a fundamental right are presumed to be uncon-
stitutional unless they can be justified by showing the furtherance of a
compelling state interest.80 The Constitution 81 guarantees each in-
dividual the freedom to decide whether to enter into8 2 or alter his
78. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See Note, Recognizing the Father-Illegitimate Child Relationship
for Intestate Succession, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. (1977).
79. Id. at 767, citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
80. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
81. The Court has found privacy to be guaranteed under the penumbra of the First
Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments as protection against government intrusions "of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life," id. at 484-85, and under the Ninth Amendment as a fundamental right
that is not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
Justice Black in his dissent in Griswold, however, could not agree that a general right of
privacy was implicit in the various amendments. He stated that "[one of the most effective ways
of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word
or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or
less restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term 'right of privacy.'
... Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), suit was brought by two
pregnant school teachers challenging the school board's mandatory leave rule. The Court, in
finding that the mandatory rule violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stated that it had long recognized "that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected." Id. at 639. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the Planned Parenthood League were convicted of violating the Connecticut Birth
Control Laws when they gave out information, instruction and medical advice to married per-
sons about contraceptives. The Court found the law to be unconstitutional and intruded upon
the right of marital privacy. This privacy is the right to choose whether or not to have children.
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family associations83 and how to rear and educate his child. 84  This
freedom of choice applies to the "individual, married or single." 85
The right of privacy has been held to be so broad as to include a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy 86 and a patient's deci-
sion to decline medical treatment.8 7 By comparison, the right of a
natural father and an illegitimate child to form a family relationship
does not appear to be as extreme, and thus ought to have been af-
forded the full constitutional protection by the Fiallo Court.
Lower courts have not evaded equal protection questions when
presented with such issues, even though they were in the context of
the immigration laws. In Faustino v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service 88 and a series of similar cases 8 9 a child challenged a provision
of the Act which allowed a citizen over 21 years of age to secure an
immediate relative status for his alien parents but denied that
privilege if the citizen was under 21 years of age. Applying minimal
scrutiny, the courts have not found this classification to be unconstitu-
tional. The majority in Fiallo alluded to these cases 90 to support their
83. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a pregnant single woman brought a class action
challenging the constitutionality of a Texas criminal law which proscribed procuring or attempt-
ing an abortion except on medical advice for purposes of saving a mother's life. The Court held
that the abortion acts violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
protects the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 156-62. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court
upheld provisions of an abortion statute which required a woman's prior written consent, and
recordkeeping and reporting procedures. It found unconstitutional those provisions which re-
quired the spouse's consent or the parent's consent in the situation of a minor. It also found
unconstitutional a provision which prohibited the most commonly used abortion procedure,
saline amniocentesis.
84. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court found that a compulsory
education act which required attendance at a public school violated the Constitution in that it
interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court stated that the liberty guaranteed by the
due process clause includes the right "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children .. ." Id. at 399.
85. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Court held that a Massachusetts
statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives, but prohibiting distribution of con-
traceptives to single persons violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 454-55.
86. See note 83 supra.
87. The court in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), even extended the right to
third parties to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment on behalf of an individual who is
unable to do so. Id. at 53-54, 355 A.2d at 670-71. See Symposium, In Re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 243-328 (1977).
88. 432 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971).
89. The facts in the following cases are essentially the same: a minor citizen-child tried to
stay deportation proceedings of his alien-parents. Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS, 515 F.2d 1222 (5th
Cir. 1975); Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1969); Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827
(D.N.J. 1976); and Application of Amoury, 307 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
90. 430 U.S. at -797-99.
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contention that the classification in Fiallo was another example of the
distinctions Congress must make in deciding which aliens may enter
the country. However, this reliance is misplaced because the two
classifications are different. Discrimination based on age, as in Faus-
tino, has not received more than minimal scrutiny and has been pre-
sumed to be reasonable. In contrast, numerous decisions have held
that classifications based on sex or illegitimacy are unconstitutional. 9 '
The lower court of Faustino said that if "a purpose is properly within
the plenary power of Congress an attack upon that classification must
fail as not presenting a substantial constitutional question, unless the
classification can be shown to constitute 'invidious discrimina-
tion.' "92 The classification was found to be constitutional, not be-
cause it was within the immigration laws, but because it was reason-
able.
TREND IN THE LAW
There is a strong indication in today's society that an increasing
number of children, legitimate and illegitimate, are living With their
fathers. 93  Some courts have recognized that unwed fathers, like
unwed mothers, have close ties to their illegitimate children.9 4 Dr.
Lee Salk, a noted child psychologist, is of the opinion that the gender
of the parent is irrelevant, and the mother is no longer indispensable
in the rearing of the child. 95 Even Congress has realized that an
unmarried male is capable of rearing and caring for a child, and it has
followed the trend set by state adoption laws in allowing adoption of
children by unmarried individuals, male or female.
96
91. See notes 71-72, 78 supra.
92. Faustino v. INS, 302 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
93. See generally Herzog, Some Notes About Unmarried Fathers, 45 CHILD WELFARE 194
(April 1966); Sauber, The Role of the Unmarried Father, 4 WELFARE IN REVIEW 15 (1966);
Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70
MICH. L. REV. 1581 (1972).
94. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court stated that "[t]he private in-
terest . . . of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 651. See also In re Mark T., 8
Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967) (court awarded custody of an illegitimate child to the
father after mother's release of child for adoption); Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122, 210
S.E.2d 88 (1974) (court held it may order visitation rights for a father of an illegitimate despite
mother's objection); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1975) (court awarded the father
custody of his illegitimate child); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis.2d 1,
207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
95. Chicago Daily News, August 12, 1977, at 6.
96. H.R. REP. No. 568, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1639.
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On December 16, 1975, Congress approved an amendment to sec-
tion 101(b)(1)(F) 97 which permitted the adoption of an alien child by
an unmarried United States citizen, either male or female. Yet the
Fiallo Court inferred that even though Congress intended to allow an
unwed male to secure a preferential status for his adopted alien child,
Congress also intended to prohibit the unwed male from securing a
preference for his natural alien child.
Since the legislative history does not mention specifically why Con-
gress excluded the relationship between a natural father and an il-
legitimate child, a reasonable inference is that in 1957 when Congress
passed the amendment 98 permitting a natural mother and an illegiti-
mate child to receive a preference it had not anticipated the situation
in which a father and an illegitimate child would be close or choose to
be together. Justice Stevens" suggested that this is the result of
"habit rather than analysis or actual reflection." 100 Prior to 1963 sex
was commonly used as a basis for legislative classifications, often
without regard to the purpose of the legislation. 1 1 However, there
has been a significant change in the social awareness of equality be-
tween males and females.102 The present state of the law seldom
recognizes sex as a valid basis for discrimination. Since the amend-
ment was passed prior to the time the courts found gender classifica-
tions to be unconstitutional, and since Congress has not yet amended
the provision to coincide with the law, the Court in Fiallo should
have scrutinized closely the challenged legislation, rather than exer-
cising limited review. 10 3
CONCLUSION
The holding in Fiallo v. Bell is questionable. When constitutionally
protected rights of citizens were infringed upon, the Court chose to
scrutinize the government action with great restraint because they
were dealing with "an exercise of the Nation's sovereign power." 104
97. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of Dec. 16, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-155, 89
Stat. 824.
98. Pub. L. 85-316, 71 Stat. 644 repealed Pub. L. 92-584, 86 Stat. 1289.
99. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 222.
101. Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48
NEB. L. REV. 131 (1974). The author chose 1963 because in that year the Committee on Civil
and Political Rights of the President's Commission on the Status of Women published its report.
In 1963 Congress passed the Federal Equal Pay Act and in 1964 the Civil Rights Act which
prohibited sex discrimination in employment. Id. at 134.
102. Id. at 137.
103. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 173 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
104. 430 U.S. at 795-96 n.6.
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In addition to the misapplication of equal protection principles, con-
sideration of societal factors suggests that the Court's decision in
Fiallo was improper. The Court's holding was particularly insensitive
to the political and social changes that have occurred in the country.
The assumption that it is dealing with sovereign power manifested
itself in a way that is beyond the limitations of the Constitution. This
decision establishes the outer limits of Congress' power to enact im-
migration legislation that affects citizens. 10 5
Barbara Vrancik
105. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 170 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).

